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THE ROBERT L. LEVINE

DISTINGUISHED LECTURE
MYTH AND REALITY OF UNIVERSITY
TRUSTEESHIP IN THE POST-ENRON ERA
Jos A. Cabranes*
INTRODUCTION

My subject this evening is university governance and the role of trustees
in the private American university. My interest in this subject is more than
merely "academic." Before my appointment to the federal bench I served
as the first General Counsel of Yale University. I also have had the honor
and pleasure of serving for more than thirty years as a trustee of several
private universities.
A full appreciation of university trusteeship would require consideration
of a number of important questions that I must leave for another day: Who
becomes a trustee of our private universities? How and why are such
trustees selected? How long should such trustees serve in order to be
optimally useful? How are boards of trustees organized to do their work (or
not to do their work)?
These questions are important and deserve extended consideration, but in
the time available to me in a single lecture, I will focus on the institutional
role of a board of trustees within the structure of the modem American
private university.
My reflections on this subject are necessarily informed by relevant legal
developments of the past decade, namely, the collapse of Enron and the

* Judge, U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit. A.B., Columbia College; J.D., Yale
Law School; M.Litt. (International Law), University of Cambridge. My lecture is based on
the perspective of three decades of experience as a university trustee-at Fordham
University (1974-77), Colgate University (1987-90), Yale University (1987-99), and
Columbia University (2000-present) and my experience as General Counsel of Yale
University (1975-79). I am grateful to Dean William Treanor and the faculty for inviting me
and especially to Professor Daniel Richman, who arranged my visit. It is an honor to deliver
one of the series of lectures named for Robert L. Levine, whose exemplary career at the Bar
and in business is a justifiable source of pride to his law school, and an honor also to be
listed among previous Levine lecturers, including Jerry Mashaw, Saul Levmore, and Louis
Henkin. I am grateful to my law clerks Andrew DeFillippis and Alison Weir for their
editorial assistance.
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passage and implementation of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002.1 The
failures leading to Enron's collapse were widely believed to be failures of
corporate oversight-more specifically, failures in the exercise of oversight
by boards of directors.
But the proposition that Enron's directors
reasonably could have been expected to perform differently, given the
information available to them, is controversial. And the legislative reaction
to Enron and other corporate scandals-principally, the Sarbanes-Oxley
Act, with its vast increase in the cost of compliance and doing businesshas been subjected to significant criticism by commentators and public
figures across the political spectrum. 2 Because universities, like business
corporations, have governing boards, and because those boards are
organized for legal purposes as corporations, I think it is worth pondering
whether recent calls for increased accountability on Wall Street should have
some resonance in the ivory tower as well.
Let me say by way of both foundation and disclaimer: I offer today
neither theory nor analysis based on empirical research, but rather, some
impressionistic perspectives based in large measure on personal experience
and observation, as well as my understanding of the law governing these
institutions. My experience and observations are limited to a small subset
of institutions, including one small liberal arts college and three larger
universities.
I believe that the governance of public universities is
substantially different. For better and for worse, public universities are
embedded in the structures of state government, and thus are more
frequently subject to democratic political oversight.
I note for the proverbial record that I do not rely on my experiences in
any particular organization for my observations here. As they say in
movies, any similarity to real persons (or real trustees), living or dead, is
entirely coincidental and not intended by the author.
It often has been observed that all cultures live by myths and that those
myths are often based at least partially in reality. The anthropologist
Bronislaw Malinowski famously observed that "[m]yth is . . . an
indispensable ingredient of all culture . . .constantly regenerated; every

1. See Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (2002)

(codified in scattered sections of 11, 15, 18, 28, 29 U.S.C.).
2. For an example of scholarly skepticism about the Sarbanes-Oxley's corporate
governance provisions, see Roberta Romano, The Sarbanes-Oxley Act and the Making of

Quack Corporate Governance, 114 Yale L.J. 1521 (2005). Professor Romano argues that
the Act had "mismatch[ed] means and ends" and suggests that provisions such as those (1)
requiring independent audit committees, (2) restricting purchases of non-auditing services
from auditors, and (3) requiring executive certification of financial statements "should be
stripped of their mandatory force and rendered optional." Id. at 1529, 1533, 1544, 1585; see
also Greg Ip, Kara Scannell & Deborah Solomon, Panel Urges Relaxing Rules for
Oversight, Wall St. J., Nov. 30, 2006, at Cl (describing calls for reexamination of postEnron reforms by business leaders and government officials); Charles E. Schumer &
Michael R. Bloomberg, To Save New York, Learnfrom London, Wall St. J., Nov. 1, 2006, at
A29 (arguing that the post-Sarbanes-Oxley regulatory climate threatens New York's
preeminence in the financial sector by burdening corporations and encouraging them to
move overseas).
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historical change creates its mythology, which is ...but indirectly related
to historical fact."' 3 Malinowski observed that "[m]yth is a constant byproduct of living faith, which is in need of miracles; [a by-product] of
sociological status, which demands precedent; [and a by-product] of moral
'4
rule, which requires sanction."
The central myth of American private university trusteeship is this: The
boards of private universities play a significant role in the day-to-day
governance of their institutions, and they are concerned with the
achievement of measurable goals. This myth reflects the high regard in
which we tend to hold universities and, perhaps by extension, those who are
said to govern them.
However, more than thirty years as a trustee of private universities in the
United States leads me to this simple conclusion about the governing boards
of such institutions: These governing boards govern very little. Except for
approving annual budgets submitted by the university administration in
omnibus form and supporting projects by their financial largesse, trustees
play no role, or a very limited role, in major decisions that shape and define
the vital purposes of a university. They play no role in deciding who will
teach students, or what they will be taught, or shaping programs of research
and related activities using the university's resources.
In approaching a discussion of the problems of university governance, we
do well to recall that, however serious its problems in the past and in the
present, higher education in America has been hugely successful, and the
most renowned private universities have been a large part of that success.
Indeed, these private universities remain renowned precisely because of
their success.
That said, the concerns over the past several decades of a wide range of
observers about the underachievement of our colleges and universities and
the serious erosion of academic standards are, in my view, entirely and
properly justified as a subject of public inquiry.
Some of the more notable recent critics, like Derek Bok, cannot be easily
dismissed. After all, critics like Bok have had the distinction of actually
presiding over our most distinguished universities during the very time of
serious decline of intellectual standards that they now acknowledge and
5
deplore.

3. See, e.g., Bronislaw Malinowski, Myth in Primitive Psychology 92 (1926).
4. Id.; see also id. at 18 (describing myth as a "living reality"). Indeed, the legal
profession also relies on certain indispensable myths, which inform the law and our
understanding of it. See, e.g., Lon Fuller, Legal Fictions 4-5 (1967) (calling the concept of
legal fiction a "skeleton in the family of the law [that should] be taken from its closet and
examined thoroughly").
5. For examples of criticism by former university administrators of the decline in
academic quality and standards at private universities, see Derek Bok, Our Underachieving
Colleges: A Candid Look at How Much Students Learn and Why They Should Be Learning
More (2006) and Harry R. Lewis, Excellence Without a Soul: How a Great University
Forgot Education (2006).
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In a recent book, Bok laments the decline in intellectual standards and
discipline. He attributes much of the responsibility to undergraduate
curricula, curricula that "foster[] an impression [of being] little more than a
vast smorgasbord," an intellectual smorgasbord that Professor Daniel Bell
'6
rightly asserts is "an admission of intellectual defeat."
I.

MYTH VERSUS REALITY

To better understand the gulf between the myth and the reality of
American university trusteeship, let us turn first to the most important talent
scout and patron of presidents of our most renowned universities in the past
7
three decades, William Bowen.
Bowen has written with elegance and high-mindedness of the wide range
of areas in which university trustees (and board members of other
organizations) are regarded as playing some significant role. These include
guiding the organization's mission,8 reviewing the organization's
12
1
performance, 9 raising revenue, 10 policy making,' strategic planning,
13
1
4
legitimizing policy decisions, mobilizing support for decisions, giving
advice to management,1 5 and remaining vigilant. 16
Bowen, however, recognizes that, in each of these areas, university
boards often fail to discharge their17duties, particularly when compared to
the boards of business corporations.
Bowen's friend and colleague, and his sometime coauthor, the
redoubtable Derek Bok, even has suggested that trustees have governance
responsibilities to those outside the university gates. Bok argues that "[the
trustees'] function is not merely to interpret and justify the university to the
larger society but to convey the legitimate needs of that society to the
institutions they serve and to inquire whether more imaginative, more
8
effective responses should be forthcoming."'

6. Bok, supra note 5 at 262 (quoting Daniel Bell, The Reforming of General Education:
The Columbia College Experience in Its National Setting 291 (Anchor ed. 1968) (1966)).

7. Having successfully served as the president of one major American university
(Princeton) from 1972 until 1988, and as president of the Mellon Foundation from 1988 until
2006, William Bowen has helped to identify, nurture, and recruit many leaders of private
American universities. Cf Princeton Univ., The Presidents of Princeton University (2005),
http://www.princeton.edu/pr/facts/presidents/;
Andrew W. Mellon Found., History:
Overview, http://www.mellon.org/about_foundation/history(last visited Oct. 5, 2007).

8. William G. Bowen, Inside the Boardroom: Governance by Directors and Trustees
20, 23 (1994).

9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.

Id. at 20-23.
Id. at 20, 24-26.
Id. at 26.
Id. at 27-31.
Id. at 31-32.
Id. at 33.
Id.
Id. at 34-35.
See id. at 24.
Derek Bok, Universities and the Future of America 112 (1990).
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The broad and robust conception of university trusteeship, put forth in
cautiously aspirational terms. by Bowen and Bok, has been repeated and
embraced (but with fewer cautions) by university presidents across the land.
Their stake in the myth of university trusteeship is not difficult to explain:
The one thing any university president fully appreciates is that he or she
became president as a result of the formal action of the trustees-who retain
the power to fire as well as the power to hire and who themselves are
inclined to believe the myth of broad-ranging trustee authority.
In addition, an astute president recognizes the usefulness of the
trusteeship myth as a management tool-the trustees are (to borrow
Holmes's familiar image) a "brooding omnipresence" that may be invoked
by a president to explain to various university constituencies, in socially
acceptable terms, why a president is unable to agree with a particular
proposal or action. Indeed, this indirect and subtle use of the trustees by
university presidents, to veto or modify proposed actions, rests on one of
the most significant vestigial powers of trustees-the power to override
administrators by declining to approve a particular course of action.
The myth of university trusteeship is also sustained by the notion,
embraced by Richard Posner and others, that universities are fundamentally
business corporations minus the profits and the dividends. Posner has
written that "[w]hat 'not for profit' means in the university world is simply
that a university's surplus . . . does not go to shareholders but is instead

added to endowment or invested in new projects .... 19
Posner is correct that university corporations and business corporations
are otherwise rather similar, but this difference is of great consequence. It
is shareholders and their goals that provide a degree of oversight and
accountability in the case of a business corporation. Shareholders make
sure that the attention of corporate executives is appropriately focused on
their primary goals-that is to say, maximizing the proverbial bottom line.
Because universities have no stockholders and no true bottom line, but only
a broad and varied community of so-called "stakeholders," 20 universities
are not simply business corporations minus the profits and the dividends.
Universities are business corporations minus the profits and dividends and
minus oversight and accountability.

19. Richard A. Posner, The University as Business, Atlantic Monthly, June 2002, at 21,

21 (emphasis added).
20. "Stakeholders" is a term much in fashion in some quarters, and is arguably
mischievous when used in the context of for-profit entities-a way of obscuring the
fundamental obligations to the shareholders of a business enterprise and of suggesting that
others might have an equal claim to the duty of loyalty imposed by law in favor of
shareholders. See, e.g., Thomas Donaldson & Lee E. Preston, The Stakeholder Theory of the
Corporation: Concepts, Evidence, and Implications,20 Acad. Mgmt. Rev. 65, 81-82 (1995)

(describing how corporate boards are responsible to a class of stakeholders broader than
shareholders). But this word may have its legitimate uses in the realm of not-for-profit
institutions, where there are no shareholders and where, by definition, profit and the
distribution of earnings are not corporate objectives.
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If trustees do not govern the affairs of a university in any meaningful
sense, who does?
Of course, the real power in any university is, for better and for worse,
the faculty. At the founding of our earliest colleges in the seventeenth and
eighteenth centuries, faculty members governed the affairs of those
institutions-that is to say, the governing boards were made up entirely of
faculty members. 2 1 Today, the faculty's authority is exercised separately
from, and even in spite of, the board's formally prescribed authority.
Regardless of the role of the trustees as legal representatives of the
university in its dealings with external forces, it is still the faculty that
actually governs. Indeed, it could not be otherwise-but this reality may
tend to confuse donors and other caring observers who may not fully
understand that, as a practical matter, their benefactions will be managed
over time by tenured professors, whose decisions will be far beyond the
reach or ken of outsiders. As Bowen himself admits, "[B]oards almost
although that is one of the
never 'make policy' in any thoroughgoing way,
22
responsibilities frequently ascribed to them."
In other words, trustees may "legitimize" policy decisions, but these
decisions are effectively made by others, only rarely influenced by the
sentiments or the know-how of trustees. In practice, in the past century the
governance and oversight roles of university trustees have been sharply
limited by practice that has hardened into tradition and by principles of free

21. Initially modeled on their medieval British and European counterparts, our oldest
colleges and universities until the late nineteenth century had governing boards consisting of
trustees who were faculty members and/or clergymen drawn from their founding religious
organizations. These clergymen and faculty members were deeply conversant with the
circumscribed curriculum, teaching, and research at their institutions, and they were fully
capable of exercising independent judgments on the academic questions that might come
before a governing board. See George Wilson Pierson, Yale College: An Educational
History, 1871-1921, at 61 (1952); see also Columbia Univ., The Role of the Trustees of
Columbia University: The Report of the Special Trustees Committee Adopted by the
Trustees (1957).
The growth and evolution of these institutions into the centers of secular learning of the
current era-universities committed to education designed to meet the needs of an evolving
social order-required expansion of the base of financial support and stimulated the
movement toward greater participation of alumni and other independent trustees in the
governance of these universities. As Professor Pierson observed of Yale's movement from
Congregationalist college to modem university in the late nineteenth century, "There were
those who felt that such growth was impossible under religious control. Ministers of the
gospel were thought to be too narrow and dogmatic or no longer capable of raising the
necessary funds." Pierson, supra, at 61. As Harvard President Charles W. Eliot remarked in
1876, "A University [could not] be built upon a sect." Id.; see also Kushal Dave & Una Au,
Yale Corporationat 300: Town or Gown?, Yale Herald, Oct. 5, 2001, at 5 (noting that in
1870, W.W. Phelps, class of 1860, gave a speech criticizing the "reactionary" leadership of
Yale, prompting the Connecticut legislature to replace the six trustee seats given to the six
most senior state senators with seats designated for elected alumni).
22. Bowen, supra note 8, at 26.
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speech and academic freedom that protect and empower the tenured
faculty.

23

The faculty is not merely one more stakeholder in a university. It is the
mandarin class of every great American university, governing (with or
without unions, with or without faculty senates) because it is indispensable
and because members of the faculty are the only stakeholders who are
permanent. As one insightful provost said to me long ago, "Students come

and go; untenured faculty come and go; administrators come and go;
presidents come and go; trustees come and go. Only we, the tenured
' '24
faculty, are here permanently.
At the heart of faculty power are certain university freedoms that account
for the vitality, success, and influence of higher education in the Western
world, and especially in the United States, and which even the severest
critics of the modem American university would not wish to challenge or
diminish.
These freedoms are well summarized by Justice Felix Frankfurter,
himself a former faculty member at Harvard, as the freedom of a university
"to determine for itself on academic grounds who may teach, what may be
25
taught, how it shall be taught, and who may be admitted to study."
These freedoms of the academy are, first and foremost, freedom from
government intervention or coercion. Over time, this doctrine has been
invoked by university faculties and administrators as freedom not only from

23. See id.; Stephen H. Balch, The Antidote to Academic Orthodoxy, Chron. of Higher
Educ., Apr. 23, 2004, at B7 ("Between the two world wars.., colleges and universities
effected a wholesale transfer of intellectual power from trustees and presidents to specialized
faculties, wherein reason was presumed to reside. Among the incidents of that transfer were
the establishment of tenure as the, normative employment practice and the relegation of
boards and presidents to no more than an attenuated oversight of academic hiring and
curriculum."); see also, Vega v. Miller, 273 F.3d 460 (2d Cir. 2001) (granting qualified
immunity to administrators at the New York Maritime College for discharging nontenured
faculty members for allegedly inappropriate statements made in class); id. at 471-75
(Cabranes, J., dissenting) (noting the dangers of allowing termination of professors who
"reach[] a topic that some college administrator ...

believes is

. .

. beyond the 'reasonable

bounds of discourse').
24. Understandably, and unavoidably, the tenured faculty of our private universities do
not generally regard themselves as employees at all, except when they complain about some
financial policy of the central administration. Indeed, our labor laws recognize the reality of
faculty power by defining tenured faculty as "management." See, e.g., Nat'l Labor Relations
Bd. v. Yeshiva Univ., 444 U.S. 672 (1980) (holding that faculty's role is managerial in
nature); cf Nat'l Labor Relations Bd. v. Cooper Union for Advancement of Sci. and Art, 783
F.2d 29 (2d Cir. 1986) (noting that the faculty's managerial role did not include control over
nonteaching staff); Brown Univ. v. Int'l Union, No. I-RC-21368 (N.L.R.B. July 13, 2004)
(holding that graduate students are not university employees for the purposes of federal labor
laws). The mission and tenure of the faculty leads them to celebrate the "medieval truth"
that, in the words of one preeminent university president who knew exactly what faculty
liked to hear, "the professors are the university." See Peter Gay, Op-Ed., The New Yale
President's Professors, N.Y. Times, Dec. 21, 1977, at A21 (quoting former President
Kingman Brewster Jr. of Yale).
25. Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234, 263 (1957) (Frankfurter, J., concurring)
(internal quotation marks omitted).
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government regulation, but also from any meaningful oversight by
university trustees.
The freedom from meaningful oversight has meant that, apart from the
appointment of a president and (perhaps) some small number of
nonacademic officers immediately under the president, trustees play no
significant substantive role in the appointment of the key actors in a
university-its faculty, deans, and directors of academic programs and
student affairs.
There is a surface similarity here to business corporations. After all, a
board of directors of a public business corporation would not be expected to
be involved in the appointment of a director of marketing or the head of
procurement.
But the difference is clear: There is no "bottom line" to serve as a
meaningful measurement of the success of units of a university, and few if
any university trustees are able to understand or evaluate the work and
progress of upper-tier university officials who do not regularly interact with
trustees.
In these matters, trustees at most confirm or ratify by formal action the
recommendations of faculty and decanal authorities. Trustees rarely, if
ever, even ask questions for their general information about the
qualifications of the appointees that they are about to confirm to tenured
positions or to positions of academic leadership. And if they were to ask
such questions, or if they ever actually turned down a candidate for an
academic appointment (say, on the basis of articulable institutional
concerns), the university likely would be thrown into turmoil. The trustees
would surely be charged by national organizations of faculty with violating
sacred norms of the academy and maybe even violating freedoms secured
26
by the Bill of Rights.
Indeed, trustees play no significant role even on major questions relating
to the external relations of universities to the government that subsidizes
them in so many ways, for example, whether a university should offer its
students the opportunity to participate in reserved officers' training corps
(ROTC) programs.
26. See, e.g., Jonathan R. Cole, Academic Freedom Under Fire, Daedalus, Spring 2005,
at 5, 7-8. Apparently under the impression that harsh criticism of outspoken faculty
members by outsiders constitutes a threat to academic freedom, even when there is no
possible effect within the university, a former provost of Columbia University cites, inter
alia, (1) "efforts by outside groups" to "defame and discredit [a] renowned literary critic and
Palestinian advocate" and (2) letters sent by sixty-two members of Congress calling for the
firing of a professor for his remarks expressing hope for an American military defeat in Iraq.
Id. The American Association of University Professors (AAUP) has worked to protect these
professorial freedoms for many years and has taken an expansive view of their scope. For an
example of AAUP advocacy on behalf of faculty freedoms, see Am. Ass'n of Univ.
Professors, Report: Academic Freedom and Tenure, Academe, Nov.-Dec. 1993, at 37,
available
at
http://www.aaup.org/NR/rdonlyres/211 BF38C-2B2A-43E5-8FEO2455BD9713BE/Obridgeport.pdf (describing the AAUP's advocacy work on behalf of two

tenured professors terminated by the University of Bridgeport during a severe financial crisis
beginning during the 1990 academic year).
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The usual playbook is this: Trustees are informed by presidents that, for
a variety of political or academic reasons, the faculty would find the return
of ROTC intolerable and that any action to the contrary by trustees would
make the president's own position within the university untenable. Given
the power of the faculties, the president is probably right. In any case,
trustees will be reluctant to make the president vulnerable in the polity he
knows far better than they.
This exchange will mark the beginning and the end of the boardroom
conversation on a subject that touches so sensitively on the relationship of
universities to our national government-if there is any conversation on the
subject at all. On such matters, trustees simply do not exercise the
autonomous prudential judgment that one innocently may tend to associate
with the very idea of trusteeship.
In my thirty years as a university trustee, I can recall few serious
discussions of academic questions or curricular directions other than in
response to a very general presentation by a dean or faculty leader regarding
particular programs. Indeed, it was in these settings years ago that I first
encountered the delightful expression "dog and pony show" to describe
presentations to trustees by deans, designed in large measure as enervating
tours of the horizon (the academic version of essays on "How I Spent My
Summer Vacation"). This sort of presentation gives the appearance (but
only the appearance) of substantive interaction between the faculty and the
trustees on a core activity of the university.
In having such presentations, the subjects of which are invariably
selected by the president or provost, there is a suggestion that trustees have
a governance role in this area of university life. But the suggestion is
misleading if not entirely false. When it comes to academic matters,
trustees generally acquiesce passively, and routinely ratify the decisions of
other stakeholders of the university. By their formal actions ratifying the
extensive "recommendations" of the faculty and administration, trustees
merely appear to have a role in shaping such university policies. In reality
they have no role, or virtually no role, in such matters.
Should it really be otherwise? Would any of us, including those most
concerned by some of the directions of the modern American university,
expect things to be otherwise?
II. "GOVERNING BOARDS" THAT DO NOT GOVERN
Professor Donald Kagan of Yale, the eminent student of Ancient Greece

and the history of warfare, agrees with Derek Bok's concerns about the way
in which faculty power is often deployed. Rather more precisely, Kagan
observes that many of the discontents in the modern American university
are traceable directly to the absence of accountability and to "the simple
realities of power on college campuses over the last three or four decades,"
which is to say that the serious and seemingly intractable problems are a
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provosts, deans or
direct result of faculty power, a power that "presidents,
27

trustees... are largely powerless" to contest.
Faculty power led to the departure in 2007 of Lawrence Summers from
the presidency of Harvard, a university presidency notably strong because,
among other things, Harvard's board of trustees, the Harvard Corporation,
consists of only six other persons. In this instance, faculty power was
exercised quite directly, by means of a so-called "vote of no confidence" of
Harvard's Faculty of Arts and Sciences-a last-resort technique for
attacking presidents and trustees that is now so common that a Google
search for the exact phrase "faculty vote of no confidence" turns up 1630
entries as of the date of this lecture.
My own experience in the boardroom suggests there is a need for checks
and balances in our universities but that, as Professor Kagan observes, "no
president appears [to be] capable of taming the imperial faculty; almost
none is willing to try; and no one else from inside the world of the
universities.., is likely to stand up and say 'enough,' or to be followed by
28
anyone if he does."
Understandably, those who are concerned about the state of affairs in our
universities often look to the trustees of the institution for help; some even
undertake campaigns to win election as college trustees (where trustee
elections are possible), in the mistaken belief that the board is the repository
of the authority and energy that would make it possible to deter or reverse
these real or perceived trends. 29 Various "interest groups," ranging from
labor unions to ideologically motivated activist groups, sometimes seek to
capture a seat on the board in the belief that it will then be possible to
achieve their goals through the exercise of the "real power" over the affairs
of their institution. They look to trustees because they believe the myth of
American university trusteeship.
But in the modem era, few if any university trustees are in a position to
comment on academic questions in any detail, much less adjudicate them.
The modem university trustee knows little or nothing of academic
disciplines. 30 Not even-the most exasperated and disaffected observer of
the modem university should wish to stimulate trustees to exercise their

27. Donald Kagan, As Goes Harvard ... , Commentary, Sept. 2006, at 35.

28. Id. at 36.
29. Acrimony among alumni vying for influence and/or positions on the boards of major
private universities has surfaced in recent years. See, e.g., Diana Jean Schemo, Dartmouth
Alumni Battles Become a Spectator Sport, N.Y. Times, June 21, 2006, at A 10. For example,
in 2002, labor unions at Yale University spearheaded a controversial effort to elect Reverend
W. David Lee to the Yale Corporation in an apparent attempt to increase union influence
over the university. See Karen W. Arenson, Union-Backed Nominee for Board Has Yale
Upset, N.Y. Times, Apr. 11, 2002, at B 1;see also Anna Arkin-Gallagher, Behind the Scenes
Is Lee's Unorthodox Campaign Pressuring Yale-Union
of Corporation Race:
Negotiations?, Yale Herald, Mar. 7, 2002, at 1.
30. See Bok, supra note 5, at 312 (noting that "after decades of preeminence in the

world, American universities are showing signs of becoming self-satisfied"); see also Lewis,
supra note 5 (a former Dean of Harvard College raising similar concerns).

2007]

UNIVERSITY TRUSTEESHIP

vestigial legal authority over academic matters-abstract powers that may
exist as a matter of law but powers that long ago were delegated to the
faculty by trustees drawn from outside the academy who understand the
limits of their competence.
Whatever may trouble the modem American university cannot readily be
solved by trustees-indeed, some commentators go further, asserting that
solutions are simply not to be found anywhere within the structure of the
university itself. Professor Kagan, for one, concludes in a recent article that
'3
"[s]alvation, if it is to come at all, will have to comefrom without." '
The assessment or criticism of university trustees implicit in Professor
32
Kagan's suggestion that "[s]alvation ... will have to come from without"
is entirely right-namely, the impetus for reform or for minimal checks and
balances in higher education must come largely from university donors,
from legislators, and from regulators. On the matters that worry Kagan and
others-"politicized faculties" that are disconnected from American life,
and faculties and academic administrators who use donated funds for "side
deals" and purposes to which the donors would never consent-trustees are
now, alas, largely irrelevant.
If governing boards of universities do not "govern," what do they do?
It has taken me many years to reconcile myself to the idea that, in our
time, trustees exercise very little authority other than their power to hire and
fire presidents and their power to raise money and prudently manage the
university's endowment-in support of activities over which they have little
or no influence.
Generally speaking, trustees can hope to have a significant, long-term
influence on their university only in collaboration with a president who has
exceptional vision and subtle political skills, and whom the trustees are
ready and able to protect in difficult times. With the help of friendly forces
"from without" (Professor Kagan's term), trustees can do more than raise
money and prudently manage money-they can support a president's
efforts to sustain programs they believe are worth sustaining and create new
programs and centers of learning that will avoid the grip of incumbent, selfserving faculty and administrators.
The one activity of trustees in which the trustees are preeminent is, of
course, the raising and management of money. Indeed, the prudential
management of the university's assets is the one activity of university
trustees that is clearly prescribed by law. In no other activity is the trustees'
authority so clear and unchallenged. Even the elementary task of hiring a
president rarely can be undertaken by the trustees alone; nowadays the job
of hiring a president will almost invariably be shared with representatives of
other stakeholders of the university, most significantly, in recent decades,
the faculty.

31. Kagan, supra note 27, at 36 (emphasis added).
32. Id.
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But the duty to take care of an institution's assets and financial health is
everywhere narrowly defined so as to (in effect) deny trustees any
significant role in shaping the academic activities of the university other
than in providing the wherewithal for one or another project or program
recommended by the president.
This limited influence will be disguised by the circulation to trustees of
massive amounts of paper providing the basis for formal votes to approve a
particular presidential action or recommendation. And it will be disguised
by the celebration-the entirely justified celebration--of the efforts of
trustees in the inevitable campaigns, the virtually permanent, fund-raising
campaigns.
For most trustees, especially those drawn from business and financial
sectors or endeavors otherwise distant from the day-to-day work of a center
of learning, the basic role of a trustee is to support the president until or
unless he has become, for whatever reason, malodorous. At that point, the
trustees perform the vital function of firing the president and helping to find
a new one.
The widespread practice of trustee passivity in the absence of truly
incompetent presidential performance has been described as "back 'em or
sack 'em." This pithy and useful aphorism (which I first heard from fellow
trustees) describes, as best I can tell, the view of most trustees of the scope
of their fiduciary responsibilities. It also captures the actual practices of
most boards.
No one will be surprised to learn that business executives (who make up
a large part of all university boards), for example, prefer to be the sort of
trustees that they would hope to have on their own boards-namely, they
prefer "team players" who do not disturb the peace of the executive, who
recognize the limits of their own competence (limits that are especially
visible in an academic setting), and who recognize the effective limits of
their authority.
The reality of "back 'em or sack 'em" boards does not mean that trustees
do not discuss matters With a president, or that they do not offer advice to
presidents on a wide range of matters. It does not mean that trustees are
inconsequential. But it does mean that trustees generally keep out of a
president's way as he manages the academic enterprise in collaboration
with the faculty and as he pursues a vision of the university devised almost
completely by the president, the faculty, and the upper echelons of the
administration.
In turn, from the moment the senior trustee or chairman of the trustees
bestows the symbolic laurels or collar of office on a new president, the
president is off and running-his principal political concerns thereafter
being to avoid serious public confrontations with the real governing
33
authorities of the university, the faculty.
33. See Stephen Joel Trachtenberg, No Magic, Little Sleep, and Lots of Luck:
Reflections from a Long-Serving University President, Presidency, Fall 2006, at 14, 17
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Of course, no president with minimal survival skills will simply ignore
the trustees.

After all, most trustees live by the myth of university

trusteeship-they believe they are part of the governing process.

If a

president disabused them of this idea they might not continue to "back"
34
him.
To be seen as ignoring the trustees is to run the risk of losing their
confidence, thereby perhaps stimulating the trustees to perform the only
other function of which the trustees are reasonably certain-namely, the
35
ability to "sack" the president.
I hasten to repeat myself: The fact that trustees govern little or not at all

does not mean that trustees do not perform many important functions, most
notably, raising the vast sums that modem university presidents tell them
their universities require and reviewing the sort of financial reports that

provide comfort to one and all that adequate financial and audit systems are
in place.
But how well do university trustees perform their indisputable and
important role of overseeing the financial well-being of these institutions?

When it comes to helping raise money so that these institutions can
pursue the visions of their academic leaders, trustees generally perform
admirably well-indeed, so well that in recent years the richer universities
have drawn some criticism about the growing inequality of wealth among
36
institutions of higher learning.
(describing university governance as a matter of the relations of a president with the faculty,
and noting general faculty resistance to change and the corresponding need for presidents to
"find a precedent" for all suggested reforms); see also id. (invoking the aphorism often used
by savvy university presidents that the decision to step down from the presidency is a
decision to step up to the faculty).
34. A recent example of trustees' readiness to remove presidents who apparently lack
this basic understanding of the politics of small groups is the "resignation" of the president
of Cornell University, Jeffrey S. Lehman, in June 2005. See Karen W. Arenson, Cornell
President Resigns, Citing Split with Trustees, N.Y. Times, June 12, 2005, at 43. Lehman
had served as Cornell's president for less than two years when he resigned, citing
"differences" with the board of trustees regarding their "long-term vision" for the university.
Id.
35. The importance of this board function has been recognized by leaders in the business
sector. One such business leader, Warren Buffett, has described a prevailing "boardroom
atmosphere" in which it is "almost impossible" for generally "well-mannered" boards to
even debate the firing of a chief executive. Brendan Intindola, Buffett Lays More Heat on
Boards, Hous. Chron., Mar. 16, 2003, at 8D. Buffett observed that "when a compensation
committee-armed as always with support from a high-paid consultant-proposes a giant
stock option grant for the CEO, it would be like belching at the dinner table for a director to
suggest that the committee reconsider." Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). Although
recent firings and forced resignations have signaled a change in board dynamics, billionaire
investor Carl Icahn has observed somewhat colorfully that, even in the wake of the Enron
scandal, boards of directors are a travesty because "[t]hey have very little idea what's going
on ....
It's like having a class of tone-deaf kids and trying to teach them the violin." Id.
36. See, e.g., John Hechinger, When $26 Billion Isn't Enough, Wall St. J., Dec. 17, 2005,
at P1 ("The wealthiest colleges and universities are so flush with cash that, increasingly,
alumni and philanthropy experts are starting to wonder whether these schools really need
more money-and why they spend so little of it."). The embarrassment of riches found in
our largest private universities has afforded considerable luxuries to some college students,
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Trustees are good at raising money for their universities, and in most
cases they are also successful in managing the endowments their efforts
help to build. 37 But even here trustees are not immune to significant
political pressures from faculty and students-note, for example, the
elaborate programs of ethical investment that have been in place for a
38
generation at major universities.
In any event, it bears recalling that trustees have a limited role in
deciding the uses to which the monies they raise and manage are put.
Trustees approve annual university budgets, after assuring that there is
enough money in the till to pay for the programs and initiatives devised by
faculty and administration.
But they have little or no influence on the nature of the programs or
policies pursued. Trustees make sure the check does not bounce, but the
check they annually give to presidents and faculties is pretty much a blank
check.
In addition, for a number of reasons unique to the structure and
operations of universities, trustees are only moderately successful at

for example, no-loan (entirely grant-based) financial aid policies, see Florence Olson & Kit
Lively, Princeton Increases Endowment Spending to Replace Students' Loans with Grants,
Chron. of Higher Educ., Feb. 9, 2001, at A32, and increased availability of university-funded
trips and semesters abroad, see Beth McMurtrie, The Global Campus: Many American
Campuses Connect with the Broader World, Chron. of Higher Educ., Mar. 2, 2007, at A37.
Also, the wealthiest universities have continued to grow their endowments at impressive
rates. See, e.g., Jennifer Epstein, Endowment Climbs Past $13 Billion, Daily Princetonian,
Oct. 27, 2006, at 1; Elaina Johnson, MIT's Investment Returns Outpace Even Yale's, N.Y.
Sun, Oct. 25, 2006, at 10; Dax Tejera, Endowment Jumps by 18% from 2003, The
Dartmouth, Sept. 30, 2004, at 1.
37. See, e.g., Kate Linthicum, Event Launches CU Campaign, $1.6 Billion Already
Pledged, Colum. Daily Spectator, Oct. 2, 2006, at 1 (describing fund-raising efforts by the
president and trustees); Chanakya Sethi, U. Prepares for Major Campaign, Daily
Princetonian, Nov. 14, 2005, at 1 (same); Steven Xian, C.U. Kicks Off Capital Campaign,
Cornell Daily Sun, Oct. 26, 2006, at 1 (same). Efforts by the trustees of American
universities to raise capital for their institutions have led universities in Britain to emulate the
American model of fund-raising. See, e.g., Beth Carney, Britain's Universities Go Begging:
Cash Strapped College Are Following the U.S. Example and Turning to Alumnifor Help, So
Far with
No
Great Success,
BusinessWeek
Online,
Feb.
4,
2005,
http://www.businessweek.comibwdaily/dnflash/feb2005/nf2005024-3888_db01 6.htm;
Lampl Says: Ask and You '1 Receive, Times (London) (Higher Educ. Supp.), Dec. 15, 2006,
at 5. Even more recently, Oxford University considered, but failed to adopt, a proposal that
would have permitted members from outside the university to serve on its governing board.
See Oxford Dons Reject Finance Reform, BBC
News,
Dec.
19,
2006,
http://news.bbc.co.uk/l/hi/education/6190469.stm.
38. See, e.g., John G. Simon, Charles W. Powers & Jon P. Gunneman, The Ethical
Investor: Universities and Corporate Responsibility (1972). One example of efforts to
encourage ethical investing by universities and business corporations are the so-called
"Sullivan Principles," authored originally by the Reverend Leon H. Sullivan, which seek to
"support economic, social and political justice by companies when they do business." Leon
H.
Sullivan,
The
Global
Sullivan
Principles
pmbl.,
http://www.thesullivanfoundation.org/gsp/principles/gsp/default.asp (last visited Sept. 30,
2007). The principles set forth ways for avoiding support of unethical behavior and
enterprises through investment decisions. See id.
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auditing the actual uses to which university budgets are put-that is,
avoiding or punishing significant malpractices in spending.
From my observations as a trustee and from conversations with trustees
elsewhere, audit committees of university boards vary greatly in the care
and attention they are able to provide-some are totally passive until a
crisis strikes, and some (usually those audit committees led by demanding
39
lawyers) are energetic and successful.
In a large university, especially those with large science and medical
establishments, an internal auditing department is indispensable. But in
universities these internal auditing departments tend to be weak and often
ineffectual. This is so for a number of reasons: Auditors are not paid well
in comparison with the auditing staffs of business corporations (or even in
comparison with the faculty); they are hampered by a lack of familiarity
with the special practices of different parts of the university; and they are
virtually powerless in comparison with the deans of the schools and
chairmen of the departments they audit.
The university polity is the land of a thousand-the land of ten
thousand-special deals and unique arrangements, difficult for any outsider
fully to understand. These special deals are difficult for an auditor to
challenge because auditors are almost invisible in the university status and
power hierarchies. Auditors are at-will employees, and they are simply no
match for insistent, demanding, or defiant members of the permanent
establishment. If and when an auditor does report eccentric or outrageous
expenditures or practices by a favored department or by a favored member
of the bureaucracy, the report may be utterly without consequence because
senior administrators may be inclined to forgive and protect members of the
ruling class and because senior officials are not inclined to enlarge the
agenda of the trustees' audit committee.
Unlike the boards of publicly traded corporations, the trustees and
faculties of private universities generally do not modify their behavior in
response to the in terrorem threat of litigation because it is highly unlikely
that the trustees or faculty will ever suffer personal loss or liability from any
litigation against the university. Moreover, without the oversight of
stockholders, the embarrassments universities may suffer from media
interest or regulatory oversight are generally limited to matters that capture
wide public attention, such as criminal malfeasance or misappropriation of
public funds. Universities therefore are subject to less scrutiny on how they
use their own funds.
It is no coincidence that when major scandals do beset private
universities, they tend to emerge in areas of the campus supported by
federal funds-the sciences and the medical centers-where the audit
39. Apart from audit committees, smaller universities and colleges usually have no
internal auditors at all. Here, the vulnerability of having to rely entirely on outside auditors
may be offset by the prophylaxis of small size. In a small place, everyone tends to know
what everyone else is doing.
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function is enhanced by the review processes of government funding
40
agencies and by the occasional administrative or grand jury subpoena.
Another area in which trustees would be expected to be especially active
and competent is in assuring that the endowments bestowed on universities
by grateful alumni and friends are spent in a manner consistent with the
donors' purposes. Here too, I think it fair to say, trustees are largely passive
and given little information.
Development officers and campus
beneficiaries of donations are, by and large, the only persons who care a
whit about compliance with the expectations of donors and have the
necessary attention span. And the law of charities in most states provides
little or no standing to a donor to enforce his interests if university officials
41
divert targeted funds to other uses.
Because of trustee turnover, the institutional memory of a board of
trustees will fade, and in the absence of effective remedies in the courts,
donors may find their intentions frustrated. Only the threat to give no more,
and the possibility of causing an embarrassing scandal in the media,
provides donors with the protection that one assumes is ordinarily provided
42
by fiduciaries.
40. See, e.g., David McClintick, How HarvardLost Russia, Inst. Investor, Jan. 1, 2006,
at 62 (describing the grand jury investigation and eventual $31 million settlement triggered
by the Harvard Institute for International Development's allegedly corrupt management of
government funds allocated for an economic development project in Russia); see also Karen
W. Arenson, Manhattan Medical Center Says $1 Million Is Lost, N.Y. Times, Nov. 26,
2003, at B6 (describing the misappropriation of money at the Columbia University Medical
Center); Jennifer Levitz, Yale's Use of Research Grants Attracts Government Scrutiny, Wall
St. J., July 5, 2006, at A2 (describing federal investigation into Yale University's alleged
misappropriation of grant money received from the National Institutes of Health).
41. Thirty-seven states, including Connecticut and New York, have adopted a version of
the Uniform Management of Institutional Funds Act (UMIFA), which governs the use of
gifts received by various nonprofit institutions (including universities). See Lisa Loftin,
Protecting the CharitableInvestor: A Rationalefor Donor Enforcement of Restricted Gifts,
8 B.U. Pub. Int. L.J. 361, 363 n.13 (listing all thirty-seven states to adopt a form of the
UMIFA).
Section 7 of the UMIFA, entitled "Release of Restrictions on Use or Investment,"
requires the written consent of the donor or that of a court for the release of terms placed on
a gift. Unif. Mgmt. Inst. Funds Act § 7, 7A U.L.A. 35 (2006). However, the commentary
pertaining to this section makes clear that "[tihe donor has no right to enforce the restriction,
no interest in the fund and no power to change the eleemosynary beneficiary of the fund. He
may only acquiesce in a lessening of a restriction already in effect." Id. at 36. Accordingly,
courts have found, in interpreting statutes modeled on the UMIFA, that donors lack standing
to enforce the terms of their gifts. See, e.g., Carl J. Herzog Found., Inc. v. Univ. of
Bridgeport, 699 A.2d 995, 1002 (Conn. 1997).
42. A notable instance of frustrated donor intent was Yale University's receipt and
eventual return of a $20 million gift from alumnus Lee M. Bass. In 1993, Bass donated
money to support a program offering courses in Western civilization. See, e.g., Joye Mercer,
Yale PresidentSays University Was at Fault in Flap over a Returned Gift, Chron. of Higher
Educ., Nov. 14, 1997, at A44. After much delay by the university in setting up the program
and working out its details, the donor demanded the return of the gift. The university later
admitted it was at fault in handling the donation. Id.
More recently, litigation has emerged out of Princeton University's alleged
mismanagement of $35 million donated by the Robertson family, heirs to the A&P
supermarket fortune. The Robertsons allege that their family's money, which was donated
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In sum, even in this one area where the trustees' governing authority
ought to be greatest-the prudent and faithful management of the wealth of
the university-trustees tend to be less consequential, and to provide less
oversight, than is generally assumed by outside observers.
III. WHAT IS TO BE DONE?

For the reasons noted, there are significant limits on what can be done
"from the inside" to enhance or strengthen the performance of basic
fiduciary responsibilities by trustees (especially in academic matters).
Nevertheless, there are some things that can be done on the inside in the
service of trusteeship-that is, in the service of accountability. Some of
these may seem trivial, but, in my view, they can have positive long-term
consequences.
(1) The single most significant source of power remaining in university
trustees is the power of the veto-the power to refuse the trustees' formal
consent or agreement to a proposal or initiative. While trustees have little
or no ability to assert authority affirmatively, they do have the power to
deny their formal consent; trustees retain the ability to deploy this untapped
resource creatively or usefully.
The possibility or promise that the veto power will be wielded with care
by the trustees is a powerful countervailing force on an administration
under constant pressure from other quarters in the university. As far as I
have been able to observe in three decades of trusteeship, this is an
underutilized governance resource. Indeed, it is precisely because trustees
exercise their veto power rarely that the use of such power can have great
effect. When boards do invoke their rarely utilized power to check or
override the other branches of university governance, they signal to the
president, and to the university stakeholders at large, that the particular
matter under consideration is of great importance. While it may not be
possible for trustees to engage in the day-to-day policy line drawing of a
university, there are circumstances where they can draw lines in the sand
which the president and the faculty may not cross.
(2) The audit committee of the trustees should be explicitly empowered
in the bylaws to approve the hiring or firing of the head of the auditing
department and the outside auditors. In addition, the auditing department
and the outside auditors should be required to report, on a dotted line in the
university's table of organization, directly to the chair of the trustees' audit
for the establishment of a foreign policy school, has been mismanaged and used as a de facto
university slush fund. See Peter Sortino, Poisoned Ivy: Fight at Princeton Escalates over
Use of a Family's Gift, Wall St. J., Feb. 7, 2006, at Al; see also John K. Eason, The
Restricted Gift Life Cycle, or What Comes Around Goes Around, 76 Fordham L. Rev. 693,
714-32 (2007) (analyzing the Robertsons' feud with Princeton). In what is arguably a
partial admission of such mismanagement, Princeton recently agreed to return a portion of
the Robertson family's donation that had been used to support a graduate program which the
Robertsons alleged did not further the donation's intended purpose. See John Hechinger,
PrincetonReimburses Donors' Foundation, Wall St. J., Mar. 13, 2007, at A2.
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committee, as well as to the normal administration chain of command. The
auditing committee can direct the outside auditors to establish and oversee a
system to record the intentions of donors and monitor compliance, with
periodic reports43by an appropriate university official to the audit committee
of the trustees.
There should be an unmistakable understanding that the chair of the
trustees' audit committee is to be informed promptly of "breaking news" of
significant financial irregularities, in advance of any formal report to the
of the audit committee
committee at a regular session. In short, the chair
44
should never learn of such matters from the press.
One practice by which universities can promote the free flow of
information to their boards is the establishment of so-called "hotlines" for
anonymous reporting of complaints and concerns. Many corporations have
established such hotlines in the wake of the Enron scandal. Hotlines are a
means for complying with those Sarbanes-Oxley provisions requiring
business corporations to institute mechanisms for reporting dubious
conduct. 45 In the university context, universal adoption of such hotlines can
also have important benefits. It would give university stakeholders the
opportunity and the incentive to report suspicious practices before
irreparable damage is done.
(3) Trustees should also request, and be granted access to, more financial
information of all kinds. The reality is that trustees receive far too little
43. Such measures would surely help to prevent the kinds of misreporting that have
plagued universities such as Princeton and Yale in recent months. See supra note 42 and
accompanying text.
44. One of the primary purposes of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 was to enhance the
power of audit committees in publicly traded corporations. See Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002,
Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (2002) (codified in scattered sections of 11, 15, 18, 28,
29 U.S.C.). Section 301 of the Act requires the audit committees of publicly traded
companies to (1) oversee investigations of suspected wrongdoing by officers and employees,
and (2) execute that responsibility with the assistance of outside advisers such as
independent counsel and forensic accountants. Id. § 301 (amending 15 U.S.C. § 78f (2000)).
In addition, the Securities and Exchange Commission rule implementing section 307 of the
Act requires public companies' counsel to report material violations up the ladder to their
chief legal counsel or chief executive officers. 17 C.F.R. § 205.3 (2003). If these officers
fail to respond appropriately to the evidence, then attorneys must report the evidence to their
companies' audit committees or full boards of directors. Id.
As one commentator has written, another goal of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act was to increase
the meaningfulness, as well as the scope, of the audit process:
The Sarbanes-Oxley Act thus makes outside auditors part of the audit committee's
circle, rather than the CEO's. These auditors report to the audit committee any
disagreements that they might have with executives over any aspect of a firm's
accounting treatment. The Act also tries to prevent the establishment of direct or
indirect ties between the outside auditing firm and the inner circle by prohibiting
the former from providing certain lucrative non-audit services for an auditing
client ....
James Fanto, Whistleblowing and the Public Director: Countering CorporateInner Circles,
83 Or. L. Rev. 435, 528-29 (2004).
45. Requiring the establishment of such hotlines is a common feature of federal deferred
prosecution agreements. See, e.g., Leonard Orland, The Transformation of Corporate
CriminalLaw, I Brook. J. Corp. Fin. & Comm. L. 45 tbls. 1 & 2 (2006).

2007]

UNIVERSITY TRUSTEESHIP

information about a wide range of operational and financial matters within
their universities. One of my board colleagues has likened the board's need
for information to a baseball team owner's need for statistics regarding a
starting pitcher. He states that "[w]hen the baseball-team owner, based on
studying this information, decides that his manager/pitching coach is
making too many mistakes and errors of judgment, then the time comes to
consider the pros and cons of engaging a new manager/coach. '46 In a
similar vein, even university trustees who are discharging only the limited
duty to either "back" or "sack" a president can perform this function
effectively only if they have a full picture of how efficiently the university's
finances are being managed, and how well it is performing. Management is
disciplined by requirements to provide more information, and more
information makes possible meaningful board oversight.
(4) Annually setting the compensation of the president and the top
officers of administration is an indispensable tool of proper trusteeship.
This is a truism-indeed, a clich-but one honored largely in the breach.
Despite the requirements of law, the compensation of top university
leaders is regarded by presidents and insider trustees as one of the prime
"state secrets" of the academy-a matter entitled to the highest level of
confidentiality and reserved for the eyes only of the senior trustees who
form the compensation committee of the board.
Why is this a problem? Because, simply stated, an annual salary review
provides the only significant opportunity for trustees as a group to review
the performance of the person whose salary is being set. Without such a
review it is unlikely that a fiduciary can perform even the limited function
of deciding whether a leader ought to be "backed" or "sacked."
Regardless of one's view of the presidency of Lawrence Summers at
Harvard, and how it came a cropper in 2006, it bears recalling one
seemingly minor episode in that drama-the dramatic resignation of one of
the six members of the ever-so-intimate Harvard Corporation.
Conrad K. Harper, a distinguished leader of the American Bar, resigned
from his position on the Harvard Corporation in protest of the refusal of the
Senior Fellow to place on the Corporation agenda the matter of the
president's salary.4 7 Apparently, the president's salary had been decided by
a rump group of trustees without the formal consideration and consent of
the full Corporation.

46. Letter from Stephen H. Case to author (Oct. 3, 2005) [hereinafter Case Letter] (on
file with author) (quoted with the permission of Stephen Case).
47. See Board Member's Letter of Resignation, N.Y. Times, Aug. 2, 2005, at A17
(excerpting portions of the letter of resignation of one of the members of Harvard's
governing board); Marcella Bombardieri, Harvard Corporation Member Resigns, Boston
Globe, July 29, 2005, at BI; see also 2005: A Year in Review, Diverse Issues in Higher
Educ., Dec. 29, 2005, at 34 (noting the resignation of Conrad K. Harper, a member of
Harvard's top governing board, over a proposed raise for President Lawrence H. Summers).
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The media accounts of the resignation focused on the fact that the
Harvard trustee who resigned 4 in
protest was no fan of Summers and did not
8
favor a presidential pay raise.
But there was a larger and simpler story here, one far more important
than Summers and his salary. The resignation of Conrad Harper revealed
beyond doubt that even the famously intimate six-person board of trustees
of America's oldest institution of higher learning was unwilling or unable to
hold a regular meeting at which all trustees would discharge together the
basic fiduciary duty of evaluating the performance of its chief executive.
Bylaws should require the compensation committee of the trustees to
present recommendations regarding the compensation of the president and
the top administrators to the full board on an annual basis.
This presentation should occur in an executive session (that is, in the
absence of the persons whose salaries are being discussed) and should be
made at the beginning of the work session-not when trustees are heading
for the exit.
The full board should be required to act on specific, clearly stated
recommendations presented in a memorandum that permits trustees to
compare compensation with that afforded by peer institutions. 49 In the case
of publicly held business corporations, information on compensation is
required by law to be placed on the public record. 50 Accordingly, such
matters are not likely to be a mystery to directors.
The Internal Revenue Code requires universities, like other not-for-profit
corporations, to file an annual form called the Form 990, which discloses,
among other information, the compensation of officers and the five highest
paid employees. 51 By law this form must be made available to any member
of the public who requests a copy, 52 on penalty of a daily fine for refusal to
disclose. 53 This requirement has been in existence since 1987. But
incredibly, this information-available, in principle, to anyone in the

48. The prophylactic effect of regulations penalizing excessive compensation in the
nonprofit sector, see supra note 47, arguably is limited by the fact that such regulations
contain a "safe-harbor" provision establishing a "presumption that a transaction is not an
excess benefit transaction" if certain procedures are followed in determining compensation.
See 26 C.F.R. § 53.4958-6 (2006). The provision dictates that the presumption will apply if
the salary of the person in question is (1) determined by a compensation committee within
the organization which (2) examines relevant data and (3) documents its decision-making
process. Id.
49. Since 1996, federal statutes and regulations have imposed tax penalties on
employees of nonprofits who receive "excess compensation" and on the managers of the
nonprofits who employ them. See, e.g., 26 U.S.C. § 4958 (2000) (setting forth general

conditions under which tax penalties apply); 26 C.F.R. 53.4958-4(b)(1)(ii) (implementing
statutory tax penalties through, inter alia, comparison of salaries received by nonprofit
employees with salaries for similar or equivalent work in the for-profit sector).
50. See, e.g., 17 C.F.R. §§ 228.10, 229.1100, 232.10, 245.100 (2006).

51. See 26 U.S.C. §§ 501(c), 527, 4947(a)(1).
52. See 26 U.S.C. § 6104.
53. See 26 U.S.C. § 6652(c)(1)(C).
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general public and available online to the sophisticated 54-is rarely, if ever,
made directly available to the full board of trustees; many trustees learn of a
president's salary from the student newspaper. (Indeed, some years ago I
had the dubious distinction of photocopying the Internal Revenue Service
form and distributing it to my fellow trustees, to prove to them that they had
not been given basic information that, under the law, was available to any
passerby who cared to inquire.)
An annual meeting of all trustees to evaluate top executives and set their
salaries is a minimal requirement of sound trusteeship. 55 It should be
required by the bylaws. If this effort cannot be undertaken in good faith by
boards of trustees themselves, then perhaps Congress or the state
legislatures should impose the requirement by statute.
(5) Another means of enhancing university trusteeship "from the inside"
is for concerned benefactors to target their benefactions with care; this is
disparagingly referred to as giving with "strings attached." Yale Professor
Frank Turner, the historian who served with distinction as provost of Yale,
has suggested several simple ways in which donors can ensure that their
donations are spent as intended. 56 First, Turner has suggested that likeminded donors "pool their donations [and] establish carefully structured
independent foundations charged with directing funds to a particular
institution for the fulfillment of their specific intentions. ' 57 One example of
such an arrangement is the gift of Yale's Class of 1937 to the Directed
Studies Program of Yale College, a distinguished elective Great Books
program for freshmen.
Second, Professor Turner suggested that donors leverage their financial
"largesse" in order to demand "careful financial reporting" from their
beneficiaries. More specifically, Turner has proposed that alumni donors
"divide their contributions into stages, with an initial donation provided
with the understanding that the balance
will follow only if the university
'5 8
uses the money in the way it agreed."

Professor Turner's proposals are a good start, and the insight underlying
them is a crucial one: Universities are not likely to fulfill the expectations
of their benefactors unless those benefactors make their continuing interests
clear, that is, unless their checks are staggered, so that the first check
presages the checks to follow; in that way, even large checks do not become
blank checks. Benefactors who hold a view of higher education that is at
odds with the prevailing views of the faculty need not face a Hobson's
54. See, e.g., GuideStar, http://www.guidestar.org (providing wide-ranging data on
nonprofits to the public, including copies of Form 990s for thousands of not-for-profit

corporations).
55. See Richard P. Chait, Thomas P. Holland & Barbara E. Taylor, Improving the
Performance of Governing Boards 36-46 (1996) (describing the benefits of annual board
retreats).
56. Frank M. Turner, How Donors Can Keep Universities Honest, Wall St. J., Sept. 10,
1997, at A22.
57. Id.
58. Id. (emphasis added).
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choice either to give faculties a carte blanche with their donations or to
abandon their college altogether. Rather, they can and should carefully
target their donations to programs they admire and which can be reviewed
59
from time to time.
In sum, philanthropy with strings attached is a good thing, especially in
keeping skeptical benefactors usefully engaged with their university while
targeting funds in ways that may be free of the dead hand of incumbent
elites.
Of course, these modest proposals for enhancing university trusteeship
are not a cure, much less a complete cure, for what ails many private
American universities. These proposed actions from the inside-trusteeinitiated changes to their own procedures, encouragement of financial best
practices, and increased attention to the wishes of donors-are only as good
as the ability of trustees to maintain an attention span and a vigorous sense
of duty. But if implemented, these modest measures would shed light on
some of the darker corners of a university's operations and prevent
irresponsible or reckless actions by entrenched faculty and administrators
sitting on large endowments without strings.
That said, even these modest suggestions will, I suspect, be greeted with
reservations, resistance, and perhaps alarm by university power holders who
are not accustomed to even minimal oversight.
If reliance on the so-called "inner conscience" of the university is not
enough, we should turn to another type of conscience, suggested long ago
by (of all people) H.L. Mencken, namely, the type of conscience that he
60
described as "the inner voice that warns us somebody may be looking."
If Professor Donald Kagan is correct, then the "somebody who may be
looking" will have to be someone "from the outside." But how specifically
can universities be helped "from the outside," and who on "the outside"
should do the helping?
The most promising source for enhanced oversight of university affairs
are the great laboratories of our American democracy: state legislatures. In
particular, state legislatures might have a role to play by imposing some
limited audit and financial disclosure requirements that universities may be
reluctant to impose on themselves. 6' Of the state actors who have proposed
reforms for the nonprofit sector, former New York Attorney General Eliot
59. In doing so, they would merely be emulating programs of teaching, advocacy, and

activism which are commonplace on the campuses of private universities.
60. Joshua B. Nix, The Things People Do When No One Is Looking: An Argument for
the Expansion of Standing in the Charitable Sector, 14 U. Miami Bus. L. Rev. 147, 148

(2005) (citation omitted). I am not the first to invoke this quotation in the context of not-forprofit governance.
61. There are, of course, exceptions to this general reluctance to embrace wide-ranging
reform. For example, in August 2004 Drexel University became the first private university
to voluntarily adopt some reforms modeled on the Sarbanes-Oxley Act. See Mike Mathis,
Drexel Models Rules After Sarbanes-Oxley, Philadelphia Bus. J., Aug. 11, 2003. That said,

some caution in adopting potentially Sarbanes-Oxley reforms whole cloth may be justified.
See supra note 2.
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Spitzer offered perhaps the most convincing argument for adoption of
mandatory disclosure requirements for nonprofit entities. He rightly
observed that "governmental oversight of the nonprofit sector is in some
ways more important than oversight of the for-profit sector because forprofit companies have shareholders with a strong financial interest in
62
preventing fraud, waste and abuse of corporate assets."
Therefore, it might be appropriate to consider additional, public
disclosure requirements on universities and their boards. In other words,
universities should make more information available to their various
stakeholders and to the public at large, not just to their trustees. Requiring
publicly available audited statements that go beyond the Form 990 required
for tax-exemption purposes could also go a long way toward instilling or
enhancing an ethic of accountability in our universities. As one of my
fellow trustees has observed, financial disclosure "keeps management on
'63
their toes, sometimes preventing molehills from growing mountain sized."
Disclosure has even more importance in the university context because
trustees, unlike their for-profit counterparts in business corporations, act
with de facto impunity. Such impunity is a result of the fact, noted earlier,
that trustees are rarely if ever held personally liable for failure to perform
their fiduciary duties. The rarity with which such liability is imposed is
evidenced by the fact that the removal of board members, when it does
occur, is the subject of newspaper headlines. In 1996, for example, the
New York Board of Regents garnered a great deal of public and press
attention when it took the unusual step of removing all but one of the
trustees (and the president) of Adelphi University for a breach of their
fiduciary obligations. 64 Heightened disclosure requirements might have the
62. Eliot Spitzer, Attorney General's Legislative Program Bill No. 65-05, at 2 (n.d.)
(emphasis added) (describing proposed legislation that would impose new reporting and
audit responsibilities on large nonprofit organizations and their boards). The proposal
eventually was withdrawn due to opposition from nonprofit organizations.
63. Case Letter, supra note 46.
64. In April 1996, the New York Board of Regents acted to remove eighteen of the
nineteen trustees of Adelphi University, along with the university president. The actions
culminated in the trustees' voluntary resignation while court challenges to their removal
were pending. See Bruce Lambert, 18 Adelphi Trustees Resign, Abandoning a Court Battle,
N.Y. Times, Feb. 14, 1997, at B2. The accused trustees and president were found by the
board to have "violated legal procedures, neglected [] fiduciary duties," overcompensated
the university president, and allowed conflicts of interest for two trustees doing business
with the university. Id. The single trustee who was not the subject of removal proceedings
was Professor Donald Kagan, quoted supra notes 27-28. See Courtney Leatherman, New
York Regents Vote to Remove 18 of the 19 Adelphi Trustees of U.: Professors Are Jubilant
over an Action Rarely Taken by the State Against a Private College, Chron. of Higher Educ.,
Feb. 21, 1997, at A26.
Although Adelphi University is a private institution, New York Education Law § 226(4)
(McKinney 2000) vests in the Board of Regents the obligation and authority to review the
propriety of trustee actions alleged to constitute a neglect of duty, misconduct, or failure to
carry out the institution's educational purposes. For a copy of the report and decision of the
Board of Regents, see Comm. to Save Adelphi v. Diamandopoulos (Bd. of Regents of the
Univ. of the State of N.Y. Feb. 5, 1997), http://www.regents.nysed.gov/adelphi.html
http://www.regents.nysed.gov/adelphi.html.
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salutary effect of nipping such problems in the bud before any such highprofile removals are necessary. Of course, the usefulness of heightened
disclosure requirements will always depend on the ability of university
"stakeholders" and others to take notice of such disclosures.
Another possibly beneficial legislative reform would be a recasting of
donor standing restrictions. Although the law of most states technically
imposes a duty of obedience on recipients of a donation regarding the terms
of the gift, 65 common law doctrines and state standing laws often do not
allow private parties to enforce this duty. 66

Attorneys general-who do

have the power to enforce the fiduciary obligations of nonprofit entitiesuse this power rarely, and often lack the resources to exercise their power.

Alumni and other private donors are legitimate stakeholders of private
universities, and they ought to have a role in assuring the proper use of their

gifts.
Therefore, legislatures might be well-advised to modify their nonprofit
corporation statutes to provide private rights of action for donors to enforce
the terms of their gifts where they have explicitly reserved the right to do
so. 67 I note that the potential effects of donor litigation are currently being
tested in the courts of New Jersey, where members of the Robertson family

have claimed that the trustees of Princeton University have, over time,
converted a fund given for the establishment of a foreign policy school into

a sort of general university slush fund. 68 Whatever one might think about
65. See Restatement (Third) of Property § 10.1 (2003) ("The donor's intention is given
effect to the maximum extent allowed by law."); see also id. cmt. a ("The organizing
principle of the American law of donative transfers is freedom of disposition. Property
owners have the nearly unrestricted right to dispose of their property as they please.").
66. See Restatement (Second) of Trusts § 348 cmt. f (1959). Courts have again and
again rejected efforts by donors to enforce gift restrictions. See, e.g., Carl J. Herzog Found.
v. Univ. of Bridgeport, 699 A.2d 995, 997 (Conn. 1997) (noting that "[a]t common law, a
donor who has made a completed charitable contribution, whether as an absolute gift or in
trust, had no standing to bring an action to enforce the terms of his or her gift or trust unless
he or she had expressly reserved the right to do so" and holding that a state statute did not
alter the rule).
An exception to this tendency of state courts to deny donor standing is the decision of the
New York Appellate Division, First Department, in Smithers v. St. Luke's-Roosevelt
Hospital Center, 723 N.Y.S.2d 426 (App. Div. 2001). In Smithers, the Court granted
standing for a widow to enforce the terms of her deceased husband's $10 million gift to the
defendant hospital. The hospital allegedly misappropriated the funds, originally given for
the purpose of establishing an alcohol rehabilitation center, for other hospital projects. Id. at
431-36 (Friedman, J., dissenting). The court found that the plaintiff had standing because
New York Estate Powers and Trusts Law § 8-1.1 (McKinney 2002) did not designate the
attorney general as the sole representative of charitable donors for enforcement purposes. Id.
at 433.
67. At least one expert in nonprofit law has suggested such an approach. See Letter from
Professor Evelyn Brody, Chicago-Kent College of Law, to Sen. Chuck Grassley, Chairman,
S. Comm. on Fin., & Sen. Max Baucus, Ranking Member, S. Comm. on Fin. (July 15,
2004), available at http://www.senate.gov/-finance/Roundtable/Evelyn%20Brody.pdf
(describing a draft proposal that would deny standing unless there was "an enabling
provision in the gift instrument").
68. See Give and Take, Chron. of Higher Educ., Aug. 16, 2002, at A29; Kelley Heyboer,
Big Stakes as Donor'sHeirs Fight Princeton: Suit to Regain Gift Could Spark Others, Star
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the merits of the Robertson litigation, it is undeniable that such litigation, or
at least the threat of such litigation, will cause universities to think twice
before disregarding the wishes of donors who are, after all, the lifeblood of
any private academic institution. If the fear of litigation encourages
universities to be more open and accountable with respect to the gifts they
receive from donors, then making it slightly easier to sue universities, in the
limited circumstances where a donor has reserved his right to sue, may not
be such a bad idea.
CONCLUSION

My observations are intended to underscore the need, in any institution,
for robust and creative leadership accompanied by appropriate oversight
and accountability. The challenge for private universities, in a time of
skepticism driven in large measures by the universities themselves, is to
maintain trust in trusteeship, and to bring the reality of university
trusteeship somewhat closer to the myth of university trusteeship.

Ledger (Newark), Nov. 28, 2004, at Al; Maria Newman, Princeton University Is Sued over
Control of Foundation,N.Y. Times, July 18, 2002, at B5; see also supra note 42.
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